'Russian bureaucratic ruling elite': towards a social portrait of Russia's higher bureaucracy during the first quarter of the 19th century by Kiselev, Igor N. & Mironenko, Sergei V.
www.ssoar.info
'Russian bureaucratic ruling elite': towards a social
portrait of Russia's higher bureaucracy during the
first quarter of the 19th century
Kiselev, Igor N.; Mironenko, Sergei V.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kiselev, I. N., & Mironenko, S. V. (1991). 'Russian bureaucratic ruling elite': towards a social portrait of Russia's
higher bureaucracy during the first quarter of the 19th century. Historical Social Research, 16(2), 144-154. https://
doi.org/10.12759/hsr.16.1991.2.144-154
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-33219
»Russia's Bureaucratic Ruling Elite« 
Towards a Social Portrait of Russia's Higher Bureau-
cracy During the First Quarter of the 19th Century 
Igor N. Kiselev, Sergei V. Mironenko* 
Abstract: An attempt is made to study the social struc-
ture of Russia's bureaucratic ruling elite during the first 
quarter of the 19th century. The work is done on the 
bases of a mass statistic source: service records of bu-
reaucracy (formuliarnye spisky). The results of the re-
search undermine common stereotypes in Soviet histo-
riography. Among the higher bureaucratic elites one 
third owned no serfs whatsoever. A constant growth of 
this group was observed, especially in the central bu-
reaucracy. Thus, a close analysis of the data disproves 
the widely-held belief that real power and authority in 
Russia was connected with the landed gentry. 
Russia always was a bureaucratic state, a state in which power was on the 
side of the bureaucracy until present times. It would be difficult to 
over-emphasize the role and importance of the bureaucracy in Russian 
history. Even the tsar, whom the entire world considered the very symbol 
of autocracy, and despite the fact that enormous power was concentrated 
in his hands, had to take into account this set of institutions and persons 
involved, and to a certain extent was even depending directly of them. The 
French traveller Marquis de Custine, whose book »Russia in 1839« was a 
veritable sensation in Europe and went through many editions of enor-
mous size for the time, well understood this important factor in Russia's 
political life. »Russia is ruled by a class of high civil servants,« as he 
pointed out. »From their chancelleries, these invisible despotes, these pyg-
my-tyrans oppress the country with impunity.« The bureaucratic system 
was so powerful, Custine said, that even the Emperor himself, although in 
principle enjoying unlimited power, in fact was fettered by bureaucrats. 
»And although this may sound paradoxical,« concluded Custine, »the 
Russian Tsar often remarks that he is not at all as mighty as people think, 
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and with an astonishment which he is afraid to admit to himself, recog-
nizes that his power is limited. The limiting factor is the bureaucracy.»( 1) 
Of course, various groups of bureaucrats had various forms of influence 
on the life of the country. Petty provincial civil servants doubtless had 
little occasion to alter the political course of the country or even to exert 
any sort of pressure on it. With the higher civil service it was a different 
matter. Despite of the undisputed importance of the Emperor in the po-
litical system, it determinantly influenced both the political situation and 
the development of the Russian Empire. This explains to a large extent the 
great attention devoted to this social formation in the historical writings. 
Traditionally, historians have studied a small layer of the most impor-
tant governmental figures, neglecting the masses of more insignificant 
clerks, whose attributes are difficult to catch grasp through the patina of 
time. It is clearly time to break with this tradition and to attempt to estab-
lish a broader representation of the governing elite of Russia. The ir-
replaceable primary sources for the study of the bureaucracy in general 
and of its highest level in particular, has always been diaries, memoirs and 
correspondence. An evaluation of these sources permitted to a certain ex-
tent to describe traits and characteristics of the bureaucratic elite during 
various historical periods and were used as a reliable information to a 
establish generalized view. 
However, the subjective nature of these documents always provoked an 
aspiration to substantiate the results with more objective data, most widely 
with statistical data. To find a way to describe qualitative characteristics by 
quantitative figures. 
Among the primary sources permitting this sort of analysis, are service 
records (formuliarnye spiski), which have been widely and successfully 
used by historians during the past two decades.(2) Service were produced 
since the second half of the 18th century. The usual procedures of the 
bureaucratic system, which unceasingly developed and grew more com-
plex, required a new formula for accounting and controlling over the civil 
servants. With this in mind, special bureaus were established to carry out 
studies concerning the bureaucratic personnel. A first study, much like a 
census, took place in 1754-1756. The government called all state workers 
to give information about themselves (skaski), including biographical data 
(surname, first name, patronymic, title, rank, level of education, service 
data, number of serfs, etc.) On January 31, 1764 a decree was issued re-
quiring service records to be sent to the Senate semi-annually. The decree 
was sent out with a sample form for the service records, which included 
five columns: 1) surname, first name, patronymic, and rank; 2) age in full 
years; 3) social position, number of male serfs, and place of living district-
uezdy; 4) data of entering the service, current position; 5) promotions; 6) 
participation in military campaigns and battles; 1) disciplinary action. The 
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eighth column was filled in in case of a positive estimation for further 
service; the ninth column contained information about a possible p rona -
tion of the respondant. Two months later a new decree went out to syste-
mize the keeping of similar service records in each institution. From that 
time the service record became a fundamental document, for pre-revolu-
tionary Russian official affairs. Though the form changed, these service 
records were kept regularly until 1917. With an increasing quantity of 
information included. For example, more detailed data regarding the pro-
perty owned by the official was required including reference to the source 
of the property: by inheritance, by dowry or through purchase. Data re-
garding marital status, number and age of children also were added later. 
However, the basic selection of data remained the same. This gives the 
researcher the possibility to study the ways in which the fundamental cha-
racteristics of the Russian bureaucracy changed from the second half of 
the 18th through the beginning of the 20th century.(3) The subject of our 
research is the higher bureaucracy of Russia during this period. The 
amount of information contained in each individual service record, as well 
as the great number of service records produced during this entire period, 
would be entirely unmanageable without the use of a supercomputer. So, 
we decided, instead of limiting ourselves to a briefer chronological span, 
which would have severely weakened our ability to generalize across time, 
to concentrate our efforts on six time points within this period to have 
cross-sections of equal intervals. After building a data base using this ma-
terial we aimed at being able to sketch out the social portrait of the higher 
bureaucracy. 
As a starting date we chose 1802, instead at 1801, which might have been 
adequate as the first year of the century, but several important events 
during that year destabilized the bureaucratic system, making it less 
representative than its state of the following year. The events in question 
were connected to the murder of the Emperor Paul I, Alexander I's sig-
nificant changes in the governmental apparatus, including the forced re-
tirement of many officials devoted to Paul, as well as the promotion of 
those distrusted by him. 
From that point, we moved forward in more or less twenty-five year 
intervals, choosing 1825 for the second nodal point (on the eve of the De-
cembrist revolt), followed by 1850 (at the »apogee« of the autocracy and 
quite close to the »Great Reforms«), 1875 (when one might hope to estab-
lish the changes in the direction of modernization get up by those re-
forms), may have come into effect 1901 (the first year of the 20th century), 
and 1916 (the last stable year of the old regime). At this time we have 
completed work on the first two nodal points, and have nearly completed 
the work for the third. 
The first step in our project is to analyze the state of the higher bureau-
cracy during the first quarter of the 19th century, a period marked by the 
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War of 1812, the realization of a governmental reform program (including 
the establishment of the Ministries and the State Council), as well as cer-
tain failed attempts to completely overhaul the autocratic system (that is to 
free the serfs and to introduce a constitution).(4) 
In order to separate the higher bureaucracy, in whose hands the gover-
nance of the empire was concentrated from the general mass of the petty 
officialdom, we employed a dual approach, which considers both the rank 
and the position of each official in central and local institutions. That is 
absolutely vital for the creation of an adequate portrait of the higher bu-
reaucracy, because in the strictly bureaucratic Russian state, a wide range 
of persons not being civil servants in the proper sense earned bureaucratic 
ranks, for example doctors, artists, academics, professors, etc. For this rea-
son, it is not sufficient to built a data base of all persons with a particular 
rank (for example, »state councillor« or even »actual state councillor«), as 
an instrument for the analysis of the ruling bureaucratic elite. 
For our project we decided to include members of the State Council, 
senators, ministers, departmental directors, as well as civil servants with a 
rank not lower than the fifth rank (statskii sovetnik); from the provincial 
administration we included governors, vice-governors, highest ranking 
court officials (predsedateli palat), procurators, and marshals of the nobi-
lity. The total number of the officials there was 628 in 1802 and 684 in 
1825. It the case of central government, we excluded the war and naval 
ministries as well as the Holy Synod. We also excluded medical officials of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The officials of the imperial court occu-
pied a unique position within the administrative apparatus. These officials 
carried out specific tasks with no relationship to running the state. From 
these we included only officials who received petitions to the tsar (chinov-
niki komissii proshenii) and officials of the commission for the prepara-
tion of legislation (komissiia sostavleniia zakonov). 
After this procedure we were able to produce a list of officials of the 
ruling bureaucratic elite in 1802 and 1825 on the basis of data in the 
official governmental registers (Adres-kelendar) for 1802-1803 and 
1825-1826. We analyzed the vast majority of service records used in this 
project at the Central State Historical Archive of the USSR (TsGIA SSSR, 
f. 1349, op. 3,4). For 1825 we evaluated a number of service records in the 
collections of the Central State Military Historical Archive (TsGVIA 
SSSR). If service records for the years 1802 and 1825 were unavailable, we 
collected information from either slightly later or slightly earlier sources. 
Of the 628 civil servants who made up the higher bureaucratic elite in 
1802, we were able to obtain service records for 224 (35,7%). For 1825 the 
picture is different. From the 684 civil servants of that year we dispose of 
446 service records (65.2%).(5) It is clear that the percentage of surviving 
records is sufficiently high for 1802 and especially for 1825. The reason for 
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the discrepancy between the earlier and the later year to be found in the 
fact that record-keeping at the beginning of the century was less careful 
than later on. To a certain extent it is proable that the vast majority of the 
1802 service records which did not survive in fact never existed. 
In an other paper we have discussed the question of the representivity of 
the existing range of service records, as well as the haphazard nature of 
record keeping at that time.(6) The question of the credibility of the in-
formation contained in the service records deserves special consideration. 
This is a most complicated issue, which we intend to elucidate in a later 
article. Given the limited scope of this article, we will center at this point 
to a few general observations. Obviously was in the state's interest to main-
tain precise, correct information on civil servants. Therefore, the pres-
entation of false information by civil servants was regarded as a serious 
infraction, ana logous to the counterfeiting of documents. As for the hig-
hest bureaucratic elite, which was of a very limited size, the fact that data 
concerning these individuals was well known, practically excludes the pos-
sibility of large scale inaccuracy. Of course, not all data included in the 
service records is of the same nature. While there is a small basis for doubt 
concerning the entries on social origin, education, service history and 
awards received, legitimate questions as to the accuracy of the entries re-
garding age and, what is more important, land and serf ownership may 
arise. As for »age«, a number of errors are well-known due to biographical 
research. A number of such errors may be attributed to the manner in 
which the question was formulated in the service records: not the exat 
birth date was requested but the number of full years at the time of filling 
out the service record. This caused a number of odd mistakes, the most 
wide-spread of which consisted in carrying over the same age from year to 
year. However, this kind of derivation is not significant keeping in mind 
the large number of records. 
Finally, the matter of land and serf ownership is very touchy. One must 
assume that many civil servants had good reasons to hide their true eco-
nomic situation. This is the most difficult area as to what extent infor-
mation contained in the service records corresponded to reality. But it is 
difficult to imagine that the governor, who signed all of the service records 
of officials in his jurisdiction, did not have a rather precise idea concer-
ning the material situation, in case of the various sources of income, of 
these officials. In the case of senators, ministers and, say, members of the 
State Council, it is a different matter. As a rule, they themselves signed 
their own service records. 
Thus here one may expect all sorts of discrepancies. On the other hand, 
it is difficult to believe that any of them (after all, they all were more or 
less well known), might own several hundred or thousand serfs, and re-
spond »none« in the column devoted to this question: However, it must be 
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admitted that we do not dispose of complete and totally reliable data re-
garding land and serf ownership of these bureaucratic elites. And anyway, 
it would be impossible to verify completely the accuracy of these data, 
since this would require a similar, but independent series of documents, 
like the service records, but unfortunately no such documents exist. 
The question concerning the ownership of land and serfs is doubtless 
the most important one for the social characterization of the higher bu-
reaucratic elite. Who stood at the helm of the Russian state ship during the 
first quarter of the 19th century? Wealthy landlords, as decades of Soviet 
historiography has affirmed, or? Much depends on the answer to this que-
stion. The following table presents the data contained in the service re-
cords at our disposal. 
Table 1. PROPERTY (%) 
group entire center province 
year | 1802 | 1825 | 1802 | 1825 | 1802 | 1825 
0 | 25.94 | 34.99 | 28.24 | 41.62 | 24.41 | 29.83 
1-50 | 23.58 | 17.02 21.18 | 11.35 25.20 21.43 
51-100 | 10.85 | 7.57 9.41 | 5.41 11.81 9.24 
101-200 | 10.38 | 8.27 | 7.06 | 7.03 12.60 9.24 
201-500 | 15.57 | 11.11 12.94 | 10.27 17.32 11.76 
501-1000 | 4.72 | 8.98 | 7.06 | 11.35 3.15 | 7.14 
1001-3000 | 6.60 | 7.09 | 10.59 | 6.49 | 3.94 7.56 
3001-5000 | 1.42 | 2.36 1.18 | 2.70 1.57 2.10 
over 5000 | 0.94 | 2.60 | 2.35 | 3.78 1 - | 1.68 
unknown | 5.36 5.16 6.59 | 7.04 | 4.51 3.64 
The results of our research undermine common stereotypes in Soviet hi-
storiography. Among the higher bureaucratic elites, in 1802 26% and in 
1825 35% owned no serfs whatsoever. Moreover, one observes the constant 
growth of this group. Together with the petty landlords, who owned fifty 
serfs or fewer, they made up half of the social group here under consi-
deration (50% in 1802 and 52% in 1825). It is interesting to note that the 
number of landless officials rose more quickly in the central bureaucracy. 
From 1802 to 1825 their numbers increased by 13%, whereas in the pro-
vinces the number of landless officials increased only by 5%. If one takes 
into consideration that at that time an estate with fifty serfs or fewer was 
scarcely likely to produce a very significant income, and was probably 
mortgaged to various credit institutions, then one may state that half of the 
higher bureaucracy of that time was a true bureaucracy. That is to say that 
the entire income and position of these officials depended upon their suc-
cess within the bureaucratic system. Naturally, this strongly influenced 
their attitudes toward many issues crucial to the development of the coun-
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try. Thus, if at the beginning of the 1860s the highest governmental au-
thorities were able to abolish serfdom against the demands of the majority 
of landowners, then it could not have been accomplished without the exi-
stence of a powerful and highly developed bureaucratic apparatus, which 
did not attempt to defend the will and interests of the landed gentry. In 
other words, the autocracy, by means of its bureaucracy, carried out a 
policy entirely counter to the wishes and interests of its own social founda-
tion, the landed gentry. 
It must be noted that along with the rise in landless bureaucrats, one 
observes an increase in the number of the wealthiest landowners among 
the higher civil servants, that is within the proportion which owned five 
hundred serfs or more. In 1802 the latter accounted for 14% of the total, 
whereas in 1825 their number doubled, rising to 26%. 
Data regarding the social origin of the higher officialdom, presented in 
table 2, testify to the social stability of this strata. 
Table 2. OFFICIALS BY BIRTH (%) 
group entire center province 
year 1802 | 1825 | 1802 | 1825 | 1802 | 1825 
tit. gentry | 6.28 | 6.07 | 9.89 | 10.10 | 3.79 | 2.83 
gentry 79.37 | 79.33 | 70.33 | 75.25 85.61 82.59 
clergy 2.24 3.15 | 3.30 | 2.53 1.52 3.64 
townsmen | - 1 1-35 | | 2.02 - 0.81 merchants | - | 0.45 | | 0.51 - 0.40 ober-ofic. | 3.59 | 5.62 | 5.49 | 3.54 2.27 7.29 
others 8.52 | 4.04 | 10.99 | 6.06 6.82 2.43 
unknown | 0.45 0.22 | - 0.50 0.75 | 
In both 1802 and 1825 offspring of hereditary nobles made up 85% of all 
the higher bureaucratic elites, and 6% of them were descendants of princes, 
counts and barons. Variations in the social makeup of these higher elites 
between 1802 and 1825 are nearly insignificant. By 1825 among the higher 
bureaucratic elites one encounters descendants of townsman and mer-
chants, as well as more sons of priests and the so-called »ober-ofitserskie 
deti«, that is children of military personnel born before their father had 
attained the rank of staff-officer, and with this rank, the right to heredi-
tary nobility status. The latter grew in number in the provinces by 1825, 
while it decreased in the central bureaucratic apparatus, falling from 5.5% 
in 1802 to 3.5% in 1825. 
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Table 3. EDUCATION (%) 
group entire center province 
year 1802 1 1825 1802 1 1825 1 1802 1 1825 
primary - 1 0.90 1 0.50 1 - 1 1.21 
high school | 0.45 1 2.69 - 2.51 1 0.75 2.83 part. high. | - 1 0.67 - - 1 - 1.21 higher 4.46 1 9.64 6.59 1 11.06 1 3.01 8.50 
seminary | 0.45 1 0.67 - 0.50 0.75 0.81 divinity - 1 0.67 - 1.01 1 - 0.40 military | 13.39 8.07 6.59 1 11.56 1 18.05 5.26 
specialized | 3.57 1 1.79 6.59 1 3.02 1.50 0.81 
private - 1 0.22 - 0.50 1 - -home 77.68 1 74.66 80.22 J 69.35 1 75.94 78.95 
More than 70% of the higher civil servants of the Russian Empire received 
a »domashnoe obrazovanie«, i.e. they were educated at home, which in 
itself gives some indication of the poor level of education in the country. 
But it is difficult to define precisely this »domashnoe obrazovanie«. Alt-
hough among those who received no formal education one may encounter 
some highly well educated individuals whose general level of knowledge 
excelled that of university graduates, the vast majority of persons who 
received their education at home were in fact poorly educated. In general, 
especially in the 18th century, »domashnoe obrazovanie« was of short 
duration, usually ending when the child had attained 15 years, and was 
mostly limited to training in Russian grammar, arithmetic, catechism, one 
or two foreign languages, with some general study of literature, geography 
and history. However, there is a weak, but clear tendency of more and 
more highly educated individuals to enter the higher bureaucracy. By 1825 
the number of officials with »domashnoe obrazovanie« decreased by 3%, 
whereas the number of those with higher education increased by 5%. The 
number of those with a military education decreased by 5%, this was pro-
bably connected to the considerable decrease of the number of military 
personnel at the highest level of officialdom. In 1825, by comparison with 
1802, there were 23% less higher officials with military training. Finally, 
whereas the number of higher officials with »domashnoe obrazovanie« in 
the central bureaucracy decreased by 11%, this proportion increased by 3% 
in the provincial bureaucracy. 
Unfortunately, the service records do not contain precise information 
regarding ethnic origin. To some extent this may be deduced from the 
religious affiliation, which was included in each record. However, since it 
was typical for persons of other religious denomination to convert to Or-
thodoxy, when entering government service one must be careful in using 
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these data. Nevertheless, as can be seen from table 4, these data may be 
used indirectly to put light into this problem. 
Table 4. RELIGION (%) 
group entire center province 
year 1 1802 | 1825 | 1802 1 1825 1 1802 1 1825 
Orthodox 1 97.77 | 90.36 | 25.60 1 87.94 1 99.25 1 92.31 
Catholic 1 0.89 1 3.14 | 2.20 1 4.52 1 2.02 
Lutheran 1 1.34 5.83 | 2.20 i 6.03 0.75 1 5.67 
Anglican 1 - | 0.22 | - 1 0.50 -other 1 - | 0.45 | - 1 1.01 1 - 1 
Here no major changes are to be seen. In 1802 (98%) and in 1825 (90%) the 
vast majority of higher bureaucrats were Russian Orthodox. There is a 
slight decrease between 1802 and 1825 (and we assume that the vast ma-
jority of these cases were Russians), and a slight increase in the number of 
Lutherans, Catholics, etc. It must be stated that these data do not confirm 
the assumption, widespread at the beginning of the last century, of a pre-
dominance of Germans in the higher bureaucracy. 
Table 5, which presents our data concerning age distribution, given an 
interesting insight. 
Table 5. AGE (%) 
group entire center province 
year 1802 1 1825 1 1802 1 1825 1 1802 1 1825 
under 35 | 14.35 1 6.58 1 21.43 1 5.13 1 9.60 ! 7.72 
36-40 | 16.75 1 12.24 21.43 1 10.26 13.60 1 13.82 
41-50 | 33.97 1 33.79 1 26.19 1 31.79 39.20 1 35.37 
51-60 | 26.32 30.39 21.43 1 29.23 29.60 31.30 
61-70 8.13 1 14.06 9.52 1 18.97 7.20 1 10.16 
over 70 | 0.48 1 2.95 - 1 4.62 0.80 1 1.63 unknown| 6.70 1.12 7.69 1 2.01 6.02 0.40 
In general, there is a clear rise in the median age of the higher officials. At 
the beginning of the century there were twice as many young people (35 
years of age or younger: 14% in 1892 versus 7% in 1825), while at the same 
time nearly half as many of them were sixty years and older. However, this 
process operated differently in the center and in the provinces. In the 
latter, there was almost no change in the distribution of age, which means 
that most of the changes occurred at the center. Thus, the number of offi-
cials below 35 years of age decreased by a factor of four, and those from 36 
to 40 years of age, by a factor of two. So, the majority of higher officials 
both in 1802 and in 1825 consisted of persons forty to sixty years old. 
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Finally, we give some information on the question between the rela-
tionship of the higher bureaucracy and the court. It turns out that a large 
number of the highest officials held court titles. In 1802 8.5% of the total 
number of higher officials held such titles rising to 12.3% in 1825 which in 
our opinion is not a major change in this area. 
In conclusion even our initial results, derived from the most simple 
analysis of the data, permit us to query, if not to reject many stereotypes to 
be found in recent historiography. Thus, a close analysis of the data dis-
proves the widely-held belief that real power and authority in Russia at 
the beginning of the last century was connected with with the landed gen-
try. Although a certain number of high officials were indeed wealthy 
landowners, they did not make up a majority of the ruling elite. Already at 
the beginning of the century the recruitment to the commanding levels of 
officialdom showns an increasing proportion of individuals which earned 
this living and defined their rank within society from their position in the 
bureaucracy. One cannot ignore this process, which takes on an ever grea-
ter significance over time, taking into consideration the coming and car-
rying out of the Great Reforms, as well as later historical developments. 
On the other hand, the data also permits to confirm previously elabo-
rated theories regarding the structure and growth of the higher bureau-
cracy. While it has always been assumed, that given the small number of 
institutions of higher learning as well as the absence of a tradition emp-
hasizing the importance of such education in Russia at that time. In the 
case of the level of education of the higher civil servants, for example. The 
number of highly educated bureaucrats was underestimated, but without 
quantitative analysis, this was impossible to prove. 
And finally, the preliminary social portrait of the higher bureaucratic 
elites during the first quarter of the 19th century now permits to make one 
general conclusion of great importance: the profound stability of the bu-
reaucratic system of that time. There is practically no evidence either of a 
crisis within this system or of the beginning of its breakdown. Our re-
search points almost entirely to the unchanging nature of the bureaucratic 
system. It is possible that as the century progressed certain tendencies of 
change arose; in this sense, our conclusions may seem premature. It is 
obvious, however, that our method of research, employed for the study of 
the higher bureaucratic elites right down to the fall of the monarchy, will 
help us to describe the process of breakdown to which that system became 
subject. But this remains a task for further research. 
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1802, too. 
7. Included here are all official whose service records for this column 
contain an »unknown«, or in general was not filled out. In previous 
studies, the absence of information under this heading was interpre-
ted in the way that the official did not owne any serfs. The attempt to 
obtain more reliable data has forced us to take a more rigorous ap-
proach to this question. In all the tables showing this »unknown« -
the percentage indicated has been calculated from the entire mass of 
service records. All other data inserted under all the other headings 
refer to service records which contain the corresponding necessary 
data. 
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